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THE POWER OF STATE LEGISLATURES TO
SUBPOENA FEDERAL OFFICIALS
MICHAEL VITIELLO*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Within the federal system, state legislatures and state
courts retain broad powers respectively to legislate and to adjudicate. • A congressional enactment may preempt a particular
subject matter for legislation,2 or Congress may create exclusive
federal court jurisdiction.8 Absent congressional intent to withdraw a subject matter from the state system, state legislatures
and courts share concurrent authority with Congress and the
federal courts. In those areas, at least in theory, federal and
state authorities are considered fungible.' For example, in Stone
v. Powell 5 the Court based its refusal to extend the exclusionary
rule to federal habeas corpus proceedings in part on an assumption that state courts were "functionally interchangeable forums
• Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law; B.A. 1969,
Swarthmore College; J.D. 1974, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank
Jennifer James Ausenbaugh for her invaluable research assistance. This paper is based
on research done pursuant to a grant from the Louisiana Legislature.
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. X.
2. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, HANDBOOK ON CoNSTITU·
TJONAL LAW 267-70 (1978).
3. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338{a) (1976) (exclusive jurisdiction over patents, copyrights, and trade-marks); see also Clafin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 {1876); Miller v.
Grandos, 529 F.2d 393 {5th Cir. 1976).
4. See M. REDlSH, F'Bo&RAL JuRISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLocATION OF JUDICIAL
PowER (1980):
As noted previously, under traditionally accepted notions of federalism,
state and federal courts have been considered largely fungible. Except in the
comparatively rare instance where Congress has explicitly or by implication
provided that jurisdiction is exclusively federal, state courts historically stand
equal with their federal counterparts as enforcers of federal rigbta.
IC state and federal courts are, in fact, interchangeable, there should be no
question that whenever a federal court may regulate or control the actions of
federal officers because their actions have transgressed statutory or constitu·
tional limits, absent direct congressional prohibition state courts should have
similar power. Those who believe in the current vitality of the traditional view
generally reach this conclusion.
/d. at 116 (footnotes omitted).
5. 428 u.s. 465 {1976).
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likely to provide equivalent protection for federal constitutional
rights." 8
Because of broad concurrent powers, state legislatures may
frequently be aided by acquisition of information possessed by
federal officials. The need for such information will become
acute i{ President Reagan's "New Federalism" accomplishes its
goal of shifting to the states programs currently administered by
the federal government. 7 The federal government can voluntarily relinquish such information,8 and state officials may be able
to use federal courts to procure some information.9 The question
discussed in this article is whether a state legislature may compel attendance of federal officials by use of its subpoena power.
The United States Supreme Court has never decided this
question. There is only one federal district court decision on
point. The district court in United States u. Owlett 10 found that
"complete immunity of a federal agency from state interference
is well established" and that the Pennsylvania Legislature could
not, therefore, subpoena federal officials. 11 The related question
of state courts' power over federal officials has been the subject
of more frequent adjudication. 12
After consideration of the general investigative powers of
legislative bodies and the limitation posed by the Owlett decision, this article will examine the cases involving state court, as
opposed to state legislative, power over federal officials to determine the extent to which those decisions prohibit a legislature
from compelling federal officials to appear and to testify before
it. It is the conclusion of this writer that the rationale for disallowing state courts to summon federal officials does not apply
with equal force to state legislatures-that is, that there is no
justification for a complete prohibition against a state legisla6. Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1105 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Isaacson, An Unhappy Anniversary: Amid Economic Woes, the Presi·
dent Calls for a New Federalism, TIME, Feb. 1, 1982, at 12-14.
8. See, e.g., Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1922). The holding in Ponzi
has been codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4085 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982) (authorizing a federal district court to order the production of agency records improperly withheld
from a complainant).
10. 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
11. Jd. at 741.
12. See infra notes 35-110 and accompanying text.
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ture's summoning of federal officials. It is the recommendation
of this writer that Congress enact a statute clarifying a state's
right to subpoena federal officials if the subject matter is otherwise within the legislature's competence. An alternative, though
less certain, course would be for a state legislature to establish
the same authority through litigation, up to the Supreme Court
if necessary.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

To

INVESTIGATE

The power to investigate is necessary for a legislature to
perform its function. Legislative investigation was well established in England and the United States prior to the adoption of
the Constitution. 13 Contempt and subpoena powers to coerce unwilling witnesses are necessary corollaries to that power. 14
In theory, the power to investigate is limited. The legislature can compel production of evidence only if it relates to a
proper legislative function. 1 ° Further, a legislature must observe
the constitutional rights guaranteed by the first amendment of
the United States Constitution.141
In McGrain v. Dougherty, 17 a leading case on the limits of
congressional investigations, the Court in dicta addressed the
power of state legislatures. The Court cited with approval state
court decisions upholding a legislature's implied authority "to
obtain information needed in the rightful exercise of [the] power
[to legislate]." 18
Federal courts of appeal have also held that state legisla13. For a discussion of the history of legislative powers to investigate, see McGrain
v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161-74 (1927); Keele, Note on Congressional lnuestigations,
40 A.B.A. J. 154 (1954), reprinted in LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 73-74 (C. Nutting & R. Dickerson eds. 1978).
14. See, e.g., 2 U .S.C. § 192 (1982) (making contempt of Congress a misdemeanor).
15. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 253-54 (1970), re·
printed in LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 608 (0. Hetzel ed.
1980). The legislature can force production of oral or documentary evidence only when
the evidence relates to a proper function of the legislature, including the " primary one of
enacting laws" and "such ancillary powers as judging the election of its members, expelling or disciplining members, impeaching government officials, approving appointments,
. . . and . . . punishing those who would attempt to bribe its members." ld. at 253.
16. ld. at 254. S ee, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959); Wat kins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957).
17. 273 u.s. 135 (1927).
18. Id. at 165.
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tures can inquire into areas in which they have power to legislate so long as individual rights are not violated. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example,
cautioned that "no federal court should enjoin a state legislative
committee so long as it is acting within the scope of the authority granted it by the legislature and its actions are not interdicted by the Constitution of the United States."19 According to
one commentator, "[t)he State legislatures are not confined by
anything except the possibility of conflict with Federal power."20
That is, whether a state legislature ought to be able to subpoena
a federal official should be examined in light of the general rule
that legislative power over witnesses and subject matter is
broad. Public policy requires that power be broad because of the
need for informed legislative decisions.

III.

STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER FEDERAL OFFICIALS

A question separate from recognized constitutional protections afforded to all individuals testifying before investigatory
committees is whether federal officials are entitled to invoke a
complete immunity from testifying before such bodies. The Supreme Court has never decided this question, and the only lower
court case on point is United States v. Owlett.21
In Owlett, the government sought an injunction to prevent a
Pennsylvania legislative committee from investigating the Works
Progress Administration (WPA) in that state. The committee
subpoenaed WPA officials, but the district administrator issued
a directive that "no officer or employee of the Works Progress
Administration shall furnish any information or make available
any official document or copy thereof to any person, except persons having official business with the Works Progress
Administration. " 22
The district court granted the injunction because it found
that investigation of federal agencies by state legislative commissions "is an interference with the proper governmental function
19. J ordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 605-06 (4th Cir. 1963), disapproved on
other grounds, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, 446
U.S. 719, 732 n.lO (1980).
20. T. EMERSON, supra note 15, at 254.
21. 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
22. Id. at 740.
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of the United States of America, [and that] complete immunity
of a federal agency from state interference is well established. " 23
The attempt to investigate, concluded the court, amounted to
"an invasion of the sovereign powers of the United States of
America." 2 ' In addition to theoretical concerns about sovereignty, the court was concerned about the pragmatic impact that
state investigations might have on the operation level of the federal government: "The state having the power to subpoena may
abuse that power by constantly and for long periods requiring
federal employees and necessary federal records to be before an
investigating committee. This power could embarrass, impede,
and obstruct the administration of a federal agency." 2G Further,
the court reasoned from the Supreme Court's decision in McGrain v. Dougherty26 that the Pennsylvania Legislature exceeded its power when it set up a committee to investigate an
area in which the legislature was powerless to act: "[T]he subject-matter of the investigation ... is a matter over which the
[state] has no legislative power, and the information sought cannot enable it to legislate on the subject of the investigation . . . ." 27
Although not faced with the precise question raised in Owlett, the Fifth Circuit relied on that decision in United States v.
McLeod. 28 McLeod arose out of attempts by Dallas County, Alabama officials to prevent the registration of black voters during
the early 1960's. The United States sought to enjoin a state
grand jury from investigating the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department. The government alleged inter alia that the

23. /d. at 741. In support of its view, the court cited Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S.
459 (1900) (denying a state coUJ't power to subpoena records), Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886) (denying a state court power to tax property of tht< United
States within the state), Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879) (denying a state court
power to criminally prosecute federal officials upon removal to federal court), and
Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846) (denying a state court power to attach unpaid wages of federal employees).
24. 15 F. Supp. at 742.
25. /d.
26. 273 u.s. 135 (1927).
27. 15 F. Supp. at 742. The court granted the requested injunction against the
committee despite the availability of habeas corpus because a "court of equity will not
subject the United States of America to a multiplicity of suits or compel federal officers
and employees to incur the risk of fine and imprisonment to protect the United States of
America from an illegal invasion of its sovereignty." /d. at 743.
28. 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
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intent of the county officials was to hamper the operation of the
Civil Rights Division.29 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's denial of the injunction.30 The court relied on Ow lett:
"The interference of a state grand jury is just as intolerable as
that of a state legislative committee." 31 The court did, however,
consider the defendant's contention that the investigation dealt
with violations of state law, but rejected the claim as a "patent
sham."32 Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not have to decide the more
difficult question of whether a state legislative body could subpoena federal officials on matters within this limit of state authority. The state contended that the federal attorneys should
appear and assert a privilege against answering specific questions. But the court apparently rejected that view, in dictum, in
favor of complete immunity found in Owlett: "[M]erely calling
employees of the federal government before the grand jury
would have the proscribed disruptive effect on the administration of a federal agency. " 33
As indicated, there is little case law defining the power of a
state legislature to subpoena federal officials to testify or to produce documents. Owlett and the cases that have relied on it3 '
are based on three premises. First, while the state and federal
governments are dual sovereigns, federal law is supreme in certain areas. It would, therefore, be antithetical to recognize the
power of the state legislature to compel federal officials to attend
legislative inquiries. Second, the operation of the federal government can be obstructed if state legislatures are allowed to call
federal officials away from their jobs, demand control of federal
records, or incarcerate federal officials who fail to comply with
legislative commands. Third, state legislative committees investigating federal agencies are acting without jurisdiction because
the inquiry does not relate to a proper legislative function.
Courts have relied on similar reasoning in cases involving
the more frequently litigated issue of whether a state court may
29. ld. at 738-39.
30. ld. at 752.
31. ld.
32. ld. at 751.
33. ld. at 752.
34. See, e.g., id. at 751-52; Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F.
Supp. 578, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820
(1960).
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coerce compliance of federal officials. Therefore, after a review
of the case law in that context, it may be useful to examine the
continued soundness of that reasoning.
IV.

STATE COURT POWER OVER FEDERAL OFFICIALS

The power of state courts over federal officials has been litigated frequently. The Supreme Court has not established a complete immunity for federal officials; instead, an official's capacity
to be sued depends on the relief sought by the plaintiff. Thus,
federal courts have held that state courts may issue neither the
writ of habeas corpus directing the release of a federal prisoneru
nor the writ of mandamus to force a federal official to act. 36 Conversely, federal courts have allowed state courts to hear cases
requesting damages against federal officials for acts done pursuant to their official authority. 37 A litigant may also proceed in
state court against a federal official in a case involving replevin38
or ejectment.39 Less certain is whether a state court may enjoin a
federal official. Without Supreme Court authority, lower courts
have divided on that question. 40
A.

Habeas Corpus

Prior to passage of the fugitive slave law in 1850,' 1 it was
generally assumed that state courts had the power to order the
release of a federal detainee. 4 2 Slave owners pushed for the passage of the 1850 law to expedite the return of runaway slaves by
35. Tarbles Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506 (1859).
36. McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
37. Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852).
38. Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817).
39. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893).
40. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962); Alabama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Dinkens v.
Attorney General, 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961); Alabama v.
Jones, 189 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Ala. 1960); Pennsylvania Turnpike Conun'n v. McGinnes,
179 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 820 (1960); Parry v. Delaney, 310 Mass. 107, 37 N.E.2d 249 (1941). But see
Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 F. 200, 205 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907).
41. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
42. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227 (1836); Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. 66 (1814); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841 ); United
States v. Wyngall, 5 Hill 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); In re Carlton, 7 Cow. 471 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1827); In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); In re Pleasa.nta, 11 Am. Ju.
257 (Va. 1834).
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increasing the number of federal officials empowered to issue a
certificate of ownership and by making available federal marshals to assist transportation of slaves back to the South.43
State court judges thwarted the act by issuing the writ of
habeas corpus for the release of slaves within their jurisdiction.••
In turn, federal marshals acting in deference to federal law were
incarcerated for refusing to obey state court orders. They then
sought release by seeking the writ of habeas corpus in federal
court. 411
In 1859, the Supreme Court first addressed the power of
state judges to issue the writ of habeas corpus in such cases in
Ableman u. Booth.48 Able man involved a federal prisoner convicted for aiding in the escape of a slave. A Wisconsin Supreme
Court judge ordered the prisoner's release from federal custody.•' The United States Supreme Court held that the state
court was without jurisdiction:
[A]lthough the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited
and restricted by the Constitution of the United States. And
the powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting sepa-

43. The Act of 1850 expanded a 1793 statute that gave slave owners the right to
obtain a certificate of ownership of an escaped slave from a federal judge or state magistrate. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864). The owner was then authorized to take the slave home. Since state magistrates rarely issued the certificates and
the federal court system had few judges, the 1850 Act provided that commissioners of
the federal circuit courts could issue the certificates and that federal marshals would be
available to assist slave owners in the journey back to the South.
44. See, e.g., In re Barrett, 42 Barb. 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863); In re Hopson, 40
Barb. 34. (N.Y. App. Div. 1863); Reilly's Case, 2 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 334 (N.Y. 1867); In re
Dobbs, 21 How. Pr. 68 (N.Y. 1861); Phelan's Case, 9 Abb. Pr. 286 (N.Y. 1859). See R.
HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OP PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CoRPUS 556-57 (2d ed. 1972); see also id. § V (describing state courts' exercise of jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases to free federal detainees).
45. The federal courts most often held that "when in a state habeas proceeding it
became known that the relator was in federal custody, the state court's jurisdiction
ceases, and all further proceedings in the case will be coram non judice." Ex parte Sifford, 22 F. Cas. 105, 108 (S.D. Ohio 1857). Accord Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965, 968
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856); Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 969, 972 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1855);
Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law,
F. Cas. 1007, 1010 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851);
Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 325 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850).
46. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
47. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 17-18 (1854).
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rately and independently of each other, within their respective
spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United
States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued
by a State judge or State court, as if the line of division was
traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And
the State of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these
proceedings of its judges and courts, than it would have had if
the prisoner had been confined in Michigan, or in any other
State of the Union, for an offence against the laws of the State
in which he was imprisoned. 48

Further, the Court relied on a pragmatic concern that "a Government ... could [not] have lasted a single year ... if offenses
against its laws could not have been punished without the consent of the State. "'9
The Court again considered the issue in Tarble's Case. 60
State courts had read Ableman narrowly as applying only to federal detainees incarcerated through judicial process.u Tarble involved an enlistee in the army, ordered released by a state court
judge. The Supreme Court again found federal authority supreme, and relied on the potential for disruption of the federal
government.62 Further, the Court found federal habeas corpus
proceedings adequate protection against illegal detention. 63 Most
important, in apparent reliance on the supremacy clause, the
Court grounded its decision on the sovereignty argument:
"Whenever, therefore, any conflict arises between the enactments of two sovereignties, or in the enforcement of their asserted authorities, those of the National government must have
48. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 516.
49. ld. at 515.
50. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
51. See, e.g. , Ex parte Anderson, 16 Iowa 595, 598 (1864); Ex parte McCarey, 2
Am. L. Rev. 347 (Me. 1867); In re Shirk, 5 Phila. 333 (Pa. 1863). Contra In re Spangler,
11 Mich. 298 (1863); State v. Zulich, 29 N.J.L. 409 (1862); In re Hopson, 40 Barb. 34
(N.Y. 1863); In re Dobbs, 21 How. Pr. 68 (N.Y. 1861); ln re Disinger, 12 Ohio St. 256
(1861).

52. "It is evident, as said by this court when the case of Booth was finally brought
before it, if the power asserted by that State court existed, no offense against the laws of
the United States could be punished by their own tribunals, without the permission and
according to the judgment of the courts of the State in which the parties happen to be
imprisoned . . . ." Tarble, 80 U.S. at 403. "It is manifest that the powers of the National
government could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all times, if its acts
could be interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another
sovereignty." ld. at 409.
53. Id. at 411.
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supremacy until the validity of the different enactments and authorities can be finally determined by the tribunals of the
United States."04 Laid to rest was a narrow interpretation of
Ableman: federal custody, not undisputed authority established
by a judicial proceeding, deprives the state court of jurisdiction;
the lawfulness of the detention is determined by the federal
courts. 55
Despite scholarly criticism, Tarble has been widely followed,
leading one commentator to remark that "it has been conclusively determined that the state courts possess no power ... to
remove any person from the jurisdiction of the federal officials
or courts, through the writ of habeas corpus."116 In subsequent
decisions, the Supreme Court has not repudiated Tarble and
Ableman. 111

Tarble has been subjected to criticism on various grounds.ll8
First, Tarble's insistence that the validity of "enactments ... of
the National government ... [must initially be] determined by
the tribunals of the United States"&' flies in the face of the rule
well established even prior to Tarble that state courts are empowered to enforce federal law concurrently with federal courts
so long as Congress did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.60 State court jurisdiction over cases involving federal
questions was imperative prior to 1875, when Congress placed
general federal question jurisdiction in federal courts. 81 Further,
54. ld. at 407. This view of federalism has come under serious criticism. See, e.g.,
Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964).
55. Tarble, 80 U.S. at 410.
56. Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 358
(1930). It appears that Tarble and Ableman are still controlling precedent in federal
court. See, e.g., Huff v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 564, 568 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Thomas v.
Levi, 422 F. Supp. 1027, 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1976). C/. Quillar v. United States, 272 F. Supp.
55, 56 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
57. See, e.g., Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261 (1922); Robb v. Connolly, 111
u.s. 624, 630 (1884).
58. The criticism of Tarble is generally applicable to the Supreme Court's holding
in McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) (state courts may not direct the
writ of mandamus to a federal official).
59. 80 U.S. at 407.
60. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). See also Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 n.5 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404 (1959); United
States v. Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 463, 479,(1936); Galveston, H & S.A. Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1912); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884).
61. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL
CouRTS § 1 (4th ed. 1983).
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as one commentator observed, "[t]he very statute that gives the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state courts assumes
. . . that state courts have the power to decide federal questions. " 82 The United States Constitution also supports the theory that state courts have jurisdiction over federal questions in
the very language of the supremacy clause which directs state
court judges to hold federal law supreme when that law conflicts
with state law.83 In view of this constitutional language, the enactments of Congress, and early Supreme Court decisions, commentators have found cases such as Tarble puzzling at best.64
Second, Tarble has been criticized because the Court did
not make clear if the basis for the decision was constitutional or
implication from congressional inaction.66 This criticism need
not be discussed in depth because, in either case, Congress
would have the power to reverse Tarble. Thus, if statutorily
based, Tarble is "subject to change through explicit congressional action." 86 Even if it is a constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court affirmed elsewhere the authority of the United
States to relinquish voluntarily a prisoner within its custody.67
Inferentially, Congress could grant the states the authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus to federal officials, thereby permitting a voluntary relinquishment of the detainee.

B. Mandamus
Federal courts have also denied state courts the power to
control federal officials through the use of the writ of mandamus. The seminal case is McClung u. Silliman,68 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1821. In McClung, the plaintiff requested that
62. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1399.
63. ld. at 1401-02.
64. See, e.g., id. at 1405; Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference with
Federal Activities, 51 CoLUM. L. REv. 84, 91, 97 (1951). But see M. REDISH, supra note 4,
at 119 (discussing the impact of the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment, and civil
righta legislation as evidence of the change in federal -state authority, with an intentional
move towards stronger federal authority); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)
(stating that the "legislative history (of 42 U.S.C. § 1983-federal civil rights statute]
makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created
rights").
65. M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 120-24.
66. ld. at 122 n.85.
67. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1922).
68. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
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the state court issue a writ of mandamus to the federal land registrar to force him to issue the plaintiff a deed to a tract of land.
The state court found that it had jurisdiction over the registrar
but that the plaintiff was not the owner of the land.611 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the result, but held that
the state court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ. The land
registrar's "conduct [could] only be controlled by the power that
created him." 70 State and federal courts have almost uniformly
followed McClung in denying state courts the power to issue the
writ of mandamus. 71 Despite some exceptions to the rule, 72 there
is general agreement that McClung has retained its precedential
value.73
One factor considered by the court was that at the time that
McClung was decided, Congress had not granted to the district
courts the power to issue the writ of mandamus.74 Congress
vested federal district courts with original mandamus jurisdiction in 1962.711 That grant has raised questions concerning McClung's continuing vitality. Perez u. Rhiddlehoouer76 involved a
suit brought by a district attorney in Louisiana state court
against federal voting examiners. The district attorney sought to
prevent the voting examiners from registering parish residents
who allegedly did not meet the requirements of the state voting
law. When the state court issued a temporary restraining order
that blocked registration, the voting examiners removed the case
to federal district court where the court characterized the action
as "not a mandamus action, and ... not subject to the infirmi69. ld.
70. ld. at 605.
71. See, e.g., Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 89 N.E.2d 712, 716-17
(1949); Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37 N.E.2d 225,
229-230 (1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S 818 (1942).
72. "One unexplained exception to [the McClung] line of cases ... is Northern
Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250 U.S. 135, 151-52 (1919)." M. REDISH, supra
note 4, at 116 n.47.
73. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 116.
74. Mcintire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), established the doctrine that
the federal courts could not hear original suits for mandamus but could only issue such
writs on ancillary motions. In Kendall v. United States ex. rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524, 617 (1838), this doctrine was changed to give the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia original mandamus jurisdiction, but state court jurisdiction was not addressed.
See Arnold, supra note 54, at 1392.
75. Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § l(a), 76 Stat. 744 (codified at 28
§ 1361 (1976)).
76. 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965).
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ties of such an action," but rather as an action "to enjoin the
federal examiners from registering persons who do not meet the
requirements of state laws concerned with voter qualifications. " 77 The court then discussed in a note the power of state
courts to issue writs of mandamus to federal officials and observed that McClung was at least partially based on the reasoning that state courts could not exercise power over federal officials when Congress had not given such power to the federal
courts. According to the court, "[t]o the extent that McClung
rests on the [rationale] that the federal courts had not been
given mandamus jurisdiction, it may now be questionable in the
light of [the federal law] granting such jurisdiction."78
If the district court's observation is correct that McClung
turned on the absence of congressional action, but that a different result would be required after Congress granted mandamus
jurisdiction to the district courts, two conclusions follow. First,
Tarble and McClung are not required by the Constitution because a different result would follow from congressional action.
Second, the district court in Perez suggested that it might infer
from the 1962 act empowering federal district courts to issue the
writ of mandamus a similar power to be exercised by state
courts. That reasoning would make McClung inconsistent with
Tarble because in Tarble, if understood as a congressional intent
case, the Supreme Court was unwilling to empower state courts
absent express congressional action. There it did not follow that
because a federal district court could have issued the writ of
habeas corpus a state court could do so as well. In Perez the
court expressed a willingness to infer state court power from a
statute silent on the question. The tension between plausible
readings of Tarble and McClung is further exacerbated when
one turns to other related precedents.
C.

Other Precedent

The Supreme Court has decided at least two other cases in
which state courts have attempted to exercise jurisdiction over
federal officials. In Boske v. Comingore,19 the state court held a
United States Collector of Internal Revenue in contempt for re77.
78.
79.

/d. at 69.
/d. at 69 n.S.
177 u.s. 459 (1900).
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fusing to produce copies of official reports. The collector's refusal was based on a Treasury Department regulation which directed that such reports were to be used for revenue collection
purpose only. 80 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
grant of the writ of habeas corpus and held that the detention
violated the Constitution and the laws of the United States.81
In Tennessee v. Davis,82 the state attempted to prosecute a
deputy collector for the Internal Revenue Service who allegedly
acted in self-defense while engaged in his official duty of seizing
an illicit distillery. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute permitting federal officials to remove
a criminal or civil proceeding to federal courts.83 The Court
based its decision both on the practical difficulty created if federal officials can be interfered with by state authorities and on
the principles of federalism:
If, when thus acting, and within the scope of their authority,
those officers can be arrested and brought to trial in a State
court for an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet
warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if the
general government is powerless to interfere at once for their
protection,-if their protection must be left to the action of the
State court,-the operations of the general government may at
any time be arrested at the will of one of its members ....
We do not think such an element of weakness is to be
found in the Constitution. The United States is a government
with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union,
acting upon the States and upon the people of the States.
While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far as its
sovereignty extends it is supreme. No State government can
exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it
by the Constitution, obstruct its authorized officers against its
will, or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance of any
subject which that instrument has committed to it."

Neither Boske nor Davis, however, should be read as a
broad denial of state court power over federal officials. In Boske,
80. !d. at 460.
81. !d. at 470; see also In re Turner, 119 F. 231 (S.D. Iowa 1902).
82. 100 u.s. 2S7 (1879).
•
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976).
84. 100 U.S. at 263; see also Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899) (state has no
constitutional power to interfere with internal administration of a federal institution lo·
cated within a state's territory).
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there was a direct conflict between federal and state policies, t he
kind of conflict within the preemption doctrine.85 State court action directly impaired the functioning of the federal government.
Davis merely upheld removal to federal court. By implication,
therefore, the state court had jurisdiction over the case because
removal jurisdiction is derivative. 86 Absent invocation of removal, the state court had the power to hear the case.

D.

Injunctions

The Supreme Court has not decided the question whether
state courts may enjoin federal officials.87 Among lower courts,
the general trend is to deny that authority, but there is precedent to the contrary. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v.
McGinnes 88 is illustrative of the general trend. In McGinnes, the
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (PTC), a state agency, filed
suit in federal court to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from
paying a tax refund to a taxpayer who had allegedly obtained
money to pay federal income taxes by fraud on the PTC. After
the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, it was refiled in
state court from which it was removed to federal court. 8 e With
citations to Tarble and McClung, the district court again dismissed for want of jurisdiction because a state court would have
had no power to issue the injunction.90 The court also cited Owlett, observing that limitations on the power of state legislatures
paralleled those imposed on state courts.91
The result in McGinnes seems to follow logically from Tarble. As one scholar has observed, any "distinction between injunction and habeas corpus is difficult to understand." 92 However, the case is not without irony: the theory of parity applies
85. See J . NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 2, at 267.
86. See, e.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382
(1922).
87. M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 117-18.
88. 179 F. Supp. 578 (E.O. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960). See also cases cited supra note 40.
89. 179 F. Supp. at 579-80.
90. State law was relevant because federal court jurisdiction on removal is derivative; thus, if the state court was without jurisdiction the federal court derives none. See,
e.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 61, § 38, at 150.
91. 179 F. Supp. at 582.
92. M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 118.
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when a case is removed to federal court; the court derives only
that jurisdiction which the state court had prior to removal. But
parity would not extend to the state court hearing the case in
the first instance any authority that a federal court might possess to enjoin a federal official.93
As indicated, not all federal courts have followed the
trend.84 For example, in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 8 e~ suit
was brought in state court to enjoin enforcement of an order of
the Postmaster General. After removal to federal court, the defendants moved to dismiss because the state court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a postal official. The court rejected that contention, relying on the premise of fungibility-that absent a
congressional decision to make jurisdiction exclusive, it is concurrent.88 The court also was unimpressed by the argument that
such suits would interfere with operation of government:
It was also contended on behalf of the defense that, in
view of the fact that actions of this nature are an interference
with the proper discharge of the duties imposed upon one of
the executive departments of the national government in pursuance of the Constitution, the wheels of the government may
be stopped by improper injunctions granted by state courts all
over the country, if permitted. It would be a sufficient answer
to this contention that there is no reason to presume that the
courts of the states will pervert the laws of the nation any more
than would the national courts, and that Congress is of that
opinion is conclusively evidenced by the fact that it has not
seen proper to deprive the state courts of that jurisdiction by
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of its own creation in cases of this nature, or even cases arising under the revenue laws. The reports of the Supreme Court of the United
States are full of cases which were originally instituted against
collectors of customs and internal revenue in the state courts
and removed to the national courts, and in none of them has
that high tribunal ever held that the state court in which the
93. See, e.g., Monmouth Legal Services Org. v. Carlucci, 330 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.J.
1971); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (requiring federal judicial review of actions challenging the
conduct of federal officers and seeking relief other than monetary damages).
94. See, e.g., McNally v. Jackson, 7 F.2d 373 (E.D. La. 1925); Underwood v. Dismukes, 266 F. 559 (D.R.I. 1920); City of Stanfield v. Umatilla, 192 F. 596 (C.C.D. Or.
1911).
.
95. 152 F. 200 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907).
96. /d. at 203-04.
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suit was originally instituted was without jurisdiction."

Therefore, without reference to Tarble and McClung, the circuit
court in Wyman affirmed the state court's power to enjoin postal
officials.
As will be argued below,98 in addition to being justifiable
based on the idea of fungibility, Wyman is consistent with current views of immunities. Broad immunities are contrary to just
results. Wyman rejects a broad presumption that state courts
will pervert federal law and that therefore federal officials must
always be immune from state court injunctions. By implication,
Wyman may be read to suggest that a federal official could not
raise unwarranted interference with the operation of government
as a defense to the issuance of the state court injunction.

E. Recognition of State Court Power
Apart from well-established cases involving habeas corpus
and mandamus and an uncertain trend involving injunctive proceedings, there are areas in which state court authority over federal officials is clear."' Since Teal v. Felton 100 was decided in
1852, it has been established that state courts can award damages to plaintiffs injured by federal officials. 101 In Teal, the Supreme Court affirmed a state court judgment in an action for
trover in which the plaintiff was awarded nominal damages
caused by a postmaster's refusal to deliver a newspaper to the
plaintiff. Cases following Teal have distinguished Tarble and
McClung on the basis of their respective potentials for interference with the functioning of the federal government. 102
This rationale breaks down when Supreme Court cases on
replevin 108 and ejectment ~ are examined. The power of state
1

97. ld. at 205.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 111-26.
99. See Arnold, supra note 54, at 1394.
100. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852).
101. See, e.g., Leroux v. Hudson, 109 U.S. 468 (1883); Sharpe v. Doyle, 102 U.S.
686, 690 (1881); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866); Benchley v. Gilbert, 3 F.
Cas. 158 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871); Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445, 448-50 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1853}; Williams v. McDaniel, 80 Ga. App. 614, 56 S.E.2d 926 (1949}.
102. Professor Redish observes, however, that the impact of state criminal cases
and damage actions against federal officials "may be very real." M. REDISH, supra note 4,
at 118 n.65.
103. Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817).
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courts to grant such relief has been upheld even though these
are "actions in which the judgment may differ only in form from
an injunction." 1011
State courts may assert jurisdiction over federal officials in
other contexts. State courts have jurisdiction in criminal actions
against federal officers. 106 The state's jurisdiction is circumscribed both by the defendant's right to remove the case to a
federal court107 and by the power of federal courts to secure the
prisoner's release by the writ of habeas corpus. 108 State courts
also have jurisdiction over national banks and other federal corporations.108 As one commentator has observed, "Congress . . .
has commonly assumed that federal corporations and agencies
will be suable in state courts, once the bar of sovereign immunity-which, unlike the doctrine presently being examined, prevents suit in any court, state or federal- is removed by
statute. " 110

V.

CRITICISM OF LIMITATIONS ON STATE COURTS' POWER

The law governing state court power to control the actions
of federal officials is "in confusion. " 111 The lines drawn by the
Supreme Court-such as those drawn between mandamus and
replevin or governmental agencies generally and federal
banks-are inconsistent. There is considerable dispute over
where such lines ought to be drawn. For example, one commentator observes that "the matter cannot be resolved purely by reference to authority. An appeal must be made to first principles.
Only by understanding the place of the state courts in the fed104. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893).
105. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1394-95.
106. See, e.g., United States e.x rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976).
108. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889). After United States e.x rei. Drury v. Lewis,
200 U.S. 1 (1906), it is clear that the district court has discretion in its use of the writ:
"We have repeatedly held that the acts of Congress in relation to habeas corpus do not
imperatively require the Circuit Courts to wrest petitioners from the custody of state
officers in advance of trial in the state courts, and that those courts may decline to discharge in the proper exercise of discretion." /d. at 8.
109. First Nat'! Bank v. Missouri ex rel. Barrett, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
110. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1396. The relevant federal statute allowing national
banks to be sued "in any court of law and equity," 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982), has been
construed to include state courts. Mercantile. Nat'! Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555
(1963).
111. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1397.
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eral system can the question of those courts' power over federal
officials be properly settled."112 After examining these basic
principles, most commentators have concluded that state courts
have the power over federal officials. 11 s They rely on the concurrent jurisdiction vested in state courts to argue that state courts
are fungible with federal courts, and, therefore, should have the
same authority to act. Thus, one writer relied on Alexander
Hamilton to support the theory of fungibility:
I mean not therefore to contend that the United States, in the
course of legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to the federal courts solely, if such a measure
should be deemed expedient; but I hold that the State courts
will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion
that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by
the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course
take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give
birth . . .. When in addition to this we consider the State governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in
the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE,
the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts
would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under
the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited. 114

That writer concludes that
[f]or a state court, accordingly, to order a federal official to act
according to federal law, or to obey valid state law that Congress has not displaced, is no usurpation, nor any assertion that
state courts are superior to federal courts or federal officials. It
is rather an assertion of the supremacy of law, and especially of
federal law.110

In other words, federal law, not federal courts, is supreme.
In supporting this view of fungibility, one critic of the Tarble-McClung line of cases dismisses the interference with a government rationale: "[W]hy is not the doctrine of sovereign im112. !d.
113. !d. at 1404-06; cf. Bishop, The Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts ouer
Federal Officers, 9 CoLUM. L. REv. 397, 417-18 (1909); Note, supra note 64, at 91.
114. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1398 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A.
Hamilton)).
115. ld. at 1401.
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munity, which bars relief against the Government and, in
circumstances in which the relief prayed will seriously interfere
with governmental functions, against its officers, a sufficient protection?"ue Sovereign immunity might also protect officials
whose duties are targets of writs of habeas corpus or writs of
mandamus. In addition, goes the argument, federal officials may
seek removal to federal court in many cases in which they are
haled into state court.117 Those officials may also seek expeditious habeas corpus relief, even pretrial, if unlawfully incarcerated.118 Further, rather than a blanket prohibition against state
court action, Congress can grant exclusive jurisdiction over specific areas in which state interference is real. 119
The foregoing articles suggest that the Tarble-McClung
view of dual sovereignty is wrong because it does not accord sufficient respect to the state system, and that the interference rationale is factually inaccurate. Those criticisms apply with equal
force to state legislatures and to state courts. But additional arguments can be made for allowing state legislatures the subpoena power over federal officials.

VI. THE VIEW

FROM THE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER

At the inception of this discussion, it was posited that there
are and will be increasingly wide areas of mutual state and federal legislative concern. Federal officials will often be in possession of facts necessary for informed state legislative decisions.
There is no guarantee that federal officials will voluntarily comply with a request to appear before the state body.
Although in dictum courts have treated as coterminous the
immunity of federal officials from appearing before state legislatures and the immunity of federal officials from appearing before
state courts, 110 that conclusion does not necessarily follow. The
theoretical criticism of Tarble and McClung undoubtedly applies with similar force to the legislatures in a federal system.
116. ld. at 1393.
117. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 118 n.65 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)
(1976)).
118. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1402.
119. ld. See also Note, supra note 64, at 94.
120. See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1967); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp. 578, 580, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1959);
United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736, 741 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
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But the pragmatic argument based on interference with the operation of government is even weaker when one considers the
burden of appearing before a state legislature. Extending subpoena power to state courts does not limit the number of summoning parties to the number of state courts, but leaves federal
officials open to being summoned by myriad private litigants. 121
There are far fewer occasions for state legislatures to summon
federal officials than there would be for state courts to do so. In
addition, if a state legislature were granted the right to subpoena federal officials, the federal government and its officials
would not be unprotected from abuse. If a dispute arose as to
specific questions, a witness could seek an injunction from a federal court or, if incarcerated for contempt, could petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.
The law governing immunities generally has undergone
change in recent years. The trend is clearly away from blanket
immunities because they are not favored in the law. 122 This
would seem to be especially true when the federal government
seeks equitable relief to bar completely the testimony of its employees. If a legislative inquiry is proper and is not intended to
harass and does not present an unusual burden on the government, there would seem to be no reason for equity to intervene.
Further, despite broad dicta to the contrary, the case law does
not support the existence of a complete immunity when a legislature seeks compliance.
As indicated above, case law on the legislature's power to
subpoena federal officials is scant. Owlett contains broad Ian121. Even if the complete immunity were abrogated, thereby allowing state courts
to compel attendance of federal officials, it is doubtful t hat the federal government
would grind to a halt. As indicated, supra note 93, the Administrative Procedure Act
allows federal courts to enjoin federal officials, apparently without undue hardship. State
officials may be haled into federal courts, again apparently without paralysis to state
government. See, e.g., Monnell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local
governing body subject to suit under federal civil rights act); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) (state police officer subject to suit for violation of fourth amendment of
United States Constitution); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (suit to enjoin state
officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statute).
122. See W. PRoSSER, J. WADE & V. ScHWARTZ, ToRTS: CAsEs AND MATERIALS 643677 (7th ed. 1982); C. WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 82. Cf. Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (Virginia Supreme Court not immune from suit
when exercising its enforcement powers under the state bar code}; Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978) (only qualified immunity for federal officials from civil rights
actions).
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guage that "[t]he complete immunity of a federal agency from
state interference is well established."123 It has been cited for
that proposition. 11' But the actual holdings of Owlett and the
related McCleod case are far narrower than the cited language
suggests.
In Owlett, the district court specifically found that the legislature had no jurisdiction over the area of its proposed inquiry.1211 A more narrowly written opinion, fitted to the actual
holding of Owlett, would have concluded that federal officials
are immune if federal law has preempted the field and there is
no room left for state legislation. Or, if the court's concern in
Owlett were actual harassment, as it was in McCleod, the court
could properly have granted equitable relief on that basis.128
If, as argued above, there is no real basis for denying state
legislatures the power to subpoena federal officials, the only remaining consideration is how a state legislature ought to proceed. State legislatures already have the power to issue subpoenas and conduct investigations,127 making state legislation
unnecessary. One possible procedure would be to allow the legislature to subpoena a federal official with information relevant to
an area appropriate for state legislation. If the official refused to
comply, the legislature could hold her in contempt, incarcerate
her, and challenge the validity of the complete immunity when
she petitions a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. 128 Although this writer believes that the Supreme Court would eventually narrow the immunity, for example, to cases involving actual harassment or inqumes beyond the legislature's
jurisdiction, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would
resolve that dispute or that, if it did so, the case would be decided expeditiously. Therefore, another method of establishing a
legislature's subpoena power would be preferable.
123. United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736, 741 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
124. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1967).
125. 15 F. Supp. at 740.
126. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (federal declaratory relief is
available to a federal plaintiff who demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement of a
disputed state criminal statute).
127. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
128. The question might reach the federal court with less friction, e.g., if the offi ·
cia! were to seek an injuction as in Owlett, or if one of the parties were to seek a declara·
tory judgment in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

570

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

As indicated, even in light of Tarble, the Supreme Court
has upheld the power of the Attorney General to consent to the
release of a prisoner to state officials. 129 That is, the United
States may consent to appear through its officials. This writer
recommends that Congress should enact legislation to establish
the right of a state legislature to subpoena federal officials and
to issue subpoenas duces tecum for relevant documents, subject
to limited immunity. Sample legislation follows:
(A) When an officer or an employee of an executive agency,
department, or office of the United States is subpoenaed to testify at a proceeding before a state legislative body, or any committee, or any subcommittee of such a legislative body, the officer or employee shall comply with the subpoena. Federal
officers or employees shall also provide documents, books, recordings, papers, and other materials ordered by state legislative bodies, committees, or subcommittees. If the official refuses to comply with an order to testify or produce other
materials and is not exempted from compliance by the provisions of section (B) of this statute, that official is subject to the
sanctions authorized by the state law for noncompliance with
its subpoenas.
(B) Officers and employees of agencies, departments, and offices of the United States may refuse to comply with subpoenas
or subpoenas duces tecum issued by state legislative bodies,
committees, or subcommittees only if the official makes an adequate showing before a federal district court that
(1) the information sought by the state legislature or
legislative committee or subcommittee does not relate
to a valid purpose of the state legislature or to a matter
within the state's power to legislate; or
(2) the purpose or effect of the order is to impede, obstruct, or burden unduly the operation of an agency,
department, or office of the United States or the performance of an officer's duties as authorized under
United States law.
(C) If the official makes an adequate showing under subsection
(B) (1) or (2), the federal district court shall enjoin the state
legislative body, committee, or subcommittee either from ordering the appearance of the official before the state legislature
or committee or from requiring the official to respond to specific questions or requests for documents. If the official has
129.

Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
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been incarcerated for contempt of the state legislative body,
committee, or subcommittee, and if the official makes an adequate showing under subsection (B) (1) or (2), the federal district court shall order the state officer in whose custody the
federal official has been placed to release the federal official. 180
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

The sample legislation reflects the several arguments made
in this article. It rejects the broad dicta in Owlett that federal
officials have a complete immunity from appearing before the
state legislature. The Supreme Court has never endorsed that
view. The dicta in Owlett was far broader than the facts of the
case which involved an instance of obvious abuse by a state legislature hostile to federal law. Further, a complete immunity is
bad policy in light of the legitimate needs of state lawmakers.
Section (A) of the sample bill states what this writer believes ought to be the general rule: that federal officials should
comply with state process. Further, section (A) provides specifically that the legislature may use its own sanctions to enforce
compliance. Although not specifically stated, an official could
raise defenses available to any other witness appearing before
the legislature, such as first or fifth amendment objections.
Section (B) provides for defenses available to the federal official in her capacity as a federal official. As discussed above,181
cases like Owlett and McCleod reflect valid concerns that state
agencies may act to impede proper exercise of federal authority
or to unduly burden the operation of the federal government.
Rather than require the federal official to raise these questions
defensively in the state compliance proceeding, section (B) allows the federal official to act prospectively to prevent abuse. u 2
130. In drafting this statute, this writer attempted to balance the need of the legis·
lature with the interest of comity between federal and state sovereigns. There is no room
within "Our Federalism" for frequent coercive intrusions into the sphere of the other
sovereign. Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (federal courts should not interfere
with pending state court prosecutions); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal
courts will not enjoin state criminal prosecutions unless there are extraordinary circumstances); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)
(limitation on federal court jurisdiction to enjoin state proceedings).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 21·34, 123·26.
132. Because the power of the federal comt to enjoin the state proceeding would be
express, it would be a clear exception to the general prohibition against federal injunctions against state court proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
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It also guarantees a forum- the federal district court- which is
more likely to be protective of the federal rights involved than
would be the legislature or state body seeking compliance with
its own process. Thus, the sample legislation attempts to balance
competing considerations of federal and state sovereignty, allocating to each its rightful authority.

